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Abstract 
Modern vehicles have electrical architectures whose complexity grows year after year due to 
feature growth corresponding to customer expectations. The latest of the expectations, automa-
tion of the dynamic driving task however, is poised to bring about some of the largest changes 
seen so far. In one fell swoop, not only does required functionality for automated driving drasti-
cally increase the system complexity, it also removes the fall-back of the human driver who is 
usually relied upon to handle unanticipated failures after the fact. The need to architect thus re-
quires a greater rigour than ever before, to maintain the level of safety that has been associated 
with the automotive industry.  
The work that is part of this thesis has been conducted, in close collaboration with our indus-
trial partner Scania CV AB, within the Vinnova FFI funded project ARCHER. This thesis aims 
to provide a methodology for architecting during the concept phase of development, using indus-
trial practices and principles including those from safety standards such as ISO 26262. The main 
contributions of the thesis are in two areas. The first area i.e. Part A contributes, (i) an analysis 
of the challenges of architecting automated driving, and serves as a motivation for the approach 
taken in the rest of this thesis, i.e. Part B where the contributions include, (ii) a definition of a 
viewpoint for functional safety according to the definitions of ISO 42010, (iii) a method to sys-
tematically extract information from legacy components and (iv) a process to use legacy infor-
mation and architect in the presence of uncertainty to provide a work product, the Preliminary 
Architectural Assumptions (PAA), as required by ISO 26262. The contributions of Part B to-
gether comprise a methodology to architect the PAA.   
A significant challenge in working with the industry is finding the right fit between idealized 
principles and practical utility. The methodology in Part B has been judged fit for purpose by 
different parts of the organization at Scania and multiple case studies have been conducted to 
assess its usefulness in collaboration with senior architects. The methodology was found to be 
conducive in both, generating the PAA of a quality that was deemed suitable to the organization 
and, to find inadequacies in the architecture that had not been found earlier using the previous 
non-systematic methods. The benefits have led to a commissioning of a prototype tool to support 
the methodology that has begun to be used in projects related to automation at Scania. The meth-
odology will be refined as the projects progress towards completion using the experiences gained.  
A further impact of the work is seen in two patent filings that have originated from work on 
the case studies in Part B. Emanating from needs discovered during the application of the meth-
ods, these filed patents (with no prior publications) outline the future directions of research into 
reference architectures augmented with safety policies, that are safe in the presence of detectable 
faults and failures. To aid verification of these ideas, work has begun on identifying critical sce-
narios and their elements in automated driving, and a flexible simulation platform is being de-
signed and developed at KTH to test the chosen critical scenarios. 
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Sammanfattning 
Efterfrågan på nya funktioner leder till en ständigt ökande komplexitet i moderna fordon, 
speciellt i de inbyggda datorsystemen. Införande av autonoma fordon utgör inte bara det mest 
aktuella exemplet på detta, utan medför också en av de största förändringar som 
fordonsbranschen sett. Föraren, som ”back-up” för att hantera oväntade situationer och fel, finns 
inte längre där vid höggradig automation, och motsvarande funktioner måste realiseras i de 
inbyggda system vilket ger en drastisk komplexitetsökning. Detta ställer systemarkitekter för 
stora utmaningar för att se till att nuvarande nivå av funktionssäkerhet bibehålls.  
Detta forskningsarbete har utförts i nära samarbete med Scania CV AB i det Vinnova (FFI)-
finansierade projektet ARCHER. Denna licentiatavhandling har som mål att ta fram en metodik 
för konceptutveckling av arkitekturer, förankrat i industriell praxis och principer, omfattande bl.a. 
de som beskrivs i funktionssäkerhetsstandards som ISO 26262.  
Avhandlingen presenterar resultat inom två områden. Det första området, del A, redovisar, (i) 
en analys av utmaningar inom arkitekturutveckling för autonoma fordon, vilket också ger en 
motivering för resterande del av avhandlingen. Det andra området, del B, redovisar, (ii) en 
definition av en ”perspektivmodell” (en s.k. ”viewpoint” enligt ISO 42010) för 
funktionssäkerhet, (iii) en metod för att systematiskt utvinna information från existerande 
komponenter, och (iv) en process som tar fram en arbetsprodukt för ISO 26262 – Preliminära 
Arkitektur-Antaganden (PAA). Denna process använder sig av information från existerande 
komponenter – resultat (iii) och förenklar hantering av avsaknad/osäker information under 
arkitekturarbetet. Resultaten från del B utgör tillsammans en metodik för att ta fram en PAA. 
En utmaning i forskning är att finna en balans mellan idealisering och praktisk tillämpbarhet. 
Metodiken i del B har utvärderats i flertalet industriella fallstudier på Scania i samverkan med 
seniora arkitekter från industrin, och har av dessa bedömts som relevant och praktiskt 
tillämpningsbar. Erfarenheterna visar att metodiken stödjer framtagandet av PAA’s av   lämplig 
kvalitet och ger ett systematiskt sätt att hantera osäkerhet under arkitekturutvecklingen. Specifikt 
så gjorde metoden det möjligt att identifiera komponent-felmoder där arkitekturen inte var 
tillräcklig för åstadkomma önskad riskreducering, begränsningar som inte hade upptäckts med 
tidigare metoder. Ett prototypverktyg för att stödja metodiken har utvecklats och börjat användas 
på Scania i projekt relaterade till autonoma fordon. Metodiken kommer sannolikt att kunna 
förfinas ytterligare när dessa projekt går mot sitt slut och mer erfarenheter finns tillgängliga. 
Arbetet i del B har vidare lett till två patentansökningar avseende koncept som framkommit 
genom fallstudierna. Dessa koncept relaterar till referensarkitekturer som utökats med policies 
för personsäkerhet (Eng. ”safety”) för att hantera detekterbara felfall, och pekar ut en riktning för 
framtida forskning. För att stödja verifiering av dessa koncept har arbete inletts för att identifiera 
kritiska scenarios för autonom körning. En flexibel simuleringsplattform håller också på att 
designas för att kunna testa kritiska scenarios. 
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Glossary 
The terms used in this thesis find slightly varying usage in the different fields that are touched 
upon. Commonly used terms are introduced in this section as a starting point.  
ABAS: Attribute-based architectural styles [1]. An architectural style in which con-
straints focus on component types and patterns of interaction that are relevant to quality 
attributes. [2] 
ADI: Autonomous Driving Intelligence. A term from Paper A used to refer to the addi-
tions to the legacy platform required to enable automated driving, roughly corresponding 
to the role a human driver plays in a non-automated vehicle using the ‘Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act’ loop [3] as a reference. Used to distinguish the additions to the platform, 
from the entire functionality for automation which is represented by the related term ADS. 
ADS: Automated Driving System [4]. The hardware and software that are collectively 
capable of performing the entire DDT on a sustained basis. A term used to describe a L3, 
L4 or L5 system. 
AEB: Advanced Emergency Brake [5]. A system that can automatically detect an emer-
gency situation and activate the braking system, to decelerate the vehicle with the purpose 
of avoiding or mitigating the effects of a collision. 
Architect: Person who performs the process of Architecting. In this thesis, an Architect 
refers only to those who work on the vehicular platform as a whole and is a role used within 
the methodology presented.  
Architecting [6]: Process of conceiving, defining, expressing, documenting, communi-
cating, certifying proper implementation of, maintaining and improving an architecture 
throughout a system’s life cycle. 
Architecture [6]: Fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its environment em-
bodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its design and evolution. 
ASIL: Automotive Safety Integrity Level [7]. One of four levels (A to D) to specify the 
item's or element's necessary requirements of ISO 26262 and safety measures to apply for 
avoiding an unreasonable residual risk, with D representing the most stringent and A the 
least stringent level 
ATRIUM: ArchiTectural RefInement using Uncertainty Management. Process intro-
duced in Paper C, that is part of the methodology presented in this thesis to construct the 
PAA. 
Automated: As an adjective, this term is used to denote the capability of a system, quali-
fied in that, it does not require a human to operate it under specific conditions. 
Autonomy or autonomous: Terms that are currently deprecated by the second edition of 
SAE J3016 [4]. In this thesis, they are synonymous to the term automated. 
Component: Used synonymously with Element in this thesis. 
Concern [6]: Interest in a system relevant to one or more of its stakeholders. 
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DDT: Dynamic Driving Task [4]. All the real-time operational and tactical functions re-
quired to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip 
scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints. 
Design decisions: Within these thesis, design decisions refer only to decisions made in the 
process of architecting, in the selection of one or more choices that influence the system 
under consideration.  
Diagnostic monitor: A test run by ECU software to detect the presence of faults. When 
enabled according to its criteria, and if configured to, it may save a DTC and optionally 
some snapshot information.  
Diagnostic specification: For the purposes of this thesis, a specification of the system that 
contains linked information about detectable faults, the monitors that detect them, the 
DTCs that are set and the functional effects of the faults. 
Domain expert: A role defined in the methodology presented in this thesis, denoting ex-
perts in specific areas or technologies. 
Driver or human driver: Human who is performing or will perform the DDT. 
DSL: Domain Specific Language. A modelling language specialized for a specific do-
main. 
DTC: Diagnostic Trouble Code. An identifier saved by an ECU, in case of a detected 
fault by one or more monitors.  
E/E systems: Electrical/Electronic systems [7]. System that consists of electrical and/or 
electronic elements including programmable electronic elements 
EBS: Electronic Braking Subsystem. For the purposes of this thesis, the subsystem for 
Service brakes at Scania C.V.  
ECU: Electronic Control Unit. A term for an embedded system that provides some func-
tionality, typically to control a E/E subsystem, in a vehicle. 
Element:  A system or part of a system including physical parts such as ECUs, sensors, 
and actuators; and functional components which can be individual software units as well 
as the logical aggregation of these components into functional elements. 
Extra-functional requirement: A requirement representing the qualities or properties of 
the function or services that the system provides. In this thesis, these are typically related 
to either safety or reliability.  
FSC: Functional safety concept [7]. Specification of the functional safety requirements, 
with associated information, their allocation to architectural elements, and their interaction 
necessary to achieve the safety goals. 
FSR: Functional Safety Requirement [7]. Specification of implementation-independent 
safety behaviour, or implementation-independent safety measure, including its safety-re-
lated attributes 
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Functional requirement: Requirement that specifies the services or functions of the sys-
tem.  
Functional Safety [7]: Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunc-
tioning behaviour of E/E systems. 
Or 
Functional Safety: A viewpoint defined in Section 3.4 of this thesis. 
HGV: Heavy Goods Vehicles. Vehicles that have a total weight of above 3500 kg. These 
are typically used for commercial purposes. 
Item [7]: System or array of systems to implement a function at the vehicle level, to which 
ISO 26262 is applied.  
Legacy: In this thesis, this term is used as an adjective to denote the availability of elements 
at the start of the application of the process or method.  
Lx; where x is 0 to 5: automated driving functions of level x as per the SAE system of 
classification for driving automation [4].  
Method [8]: Consists of techniques for performing a task, in other words, it defines the 
“HOW” of each task. 
Methodology [8]: A collection of related processes, methods, and tools. 
Minimal Risk Condition: A condition to which a user or an ADS may bring a vehicle to 
reduce the risk of a crash when a given trip cannot or should not be completed [4].  
OEDR: Object and Event Detection and Response [4]. The task of monitoring the driv-
ing environment and executing a response.  
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer. In the context of this thesis, represents auto-
motive manufacturers who series-produce complete vehicles that are sold to customers. 
PA: Preliminary Architecture. A term originating from ISO 26262, redefined in this the-
sis to be a set of functional elements that together represent the item.  
PAA: Preliminary Architectural Assumptions. A term from originating from ISO 26262 
refined in Section 3.4 of this thesis, as a view of the architecture governed by the Functional 
Safety viewpoint.  
Perceived Certain Domain: That part of the information domain that contains known 
information, as well as information that is assumed, for the purposes of making an analysis. 
Introduced in Paper C. 
Platform: A platform is the set of all elements that provide Electrical/Electronic (E/E) 
functionality for a vehicle including (but not limited to) software, hardware and associated 
low-level control. 
Process [8]: A “Process (P) is a logical sequence of tasks performed to achieve a particular 
objective. A process defines “WHAT” is to be done, without specifying “HOW” each task 
is performed.” At any level, process tasks are performed using methods. 
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Risk: Within this thesis, risks refer to project risks typically related to safety caused by 
design decisions made during architecting. 
Safety case [7]: Argument that the safety requirements for an item are complete, and sat-
isfied by evidence compiled from work products of the safety activities during develop-
ment 
Safety engineers: A role defined in the methodology presented in this thesis, denoting 
engineers who are tasked with assuring functional safety of the product. 
Safety goal [7]: Top-level safety requirement as a result of the hazard analysis and risk 
assessment  
Safety: Used synonymously with Functional Safety within this thesis 
Series production: The manufacturing of goods in large quantities using standardized de-
signs and processes. 
Service brakes: The braking system that uses friction on the wheels as a way to retard the 
motion of the vehicle. 
Snapshot:  Data saved by a monitor when it reports a DTC, for the purposes of debugging 
or recording system state. Typically contains information about the conditions that trig-
gered the fault and values of variables related to it.  
Software-intensive systems [6]: A system where software contributes essential influences 
to the design, construction, deployment, and evolution of the system as a whole. 
SOTIF [9]: Safety of the Intended Functionality. Currently a draft standard (ISO/WD PAS 
21448 Road vehicles – Safety of the intended functionality) intended to address safety in 
the case of hazards that are not related to functional failures.  
Subsystem: A set of related functional Elements. 
System safety: Absence of unreasonable risk. Note that this is not limited to errors caused 
by malfunctioning systems as is the term Functional safety. 
Tool [8] : an instrument that, when applied to a particular method, can enhance the effi-
ciency of the task; provided it is applied properly and by somebody with proper skills and 
training. 
UML: Unified Modelling Language. A graphical modelling language for visualizing, 
specifying, constructing, and documenting artefacts of a software-intensive system. 
Uncertain domain:  The part of the information domain that contains information that is 
subject to the possibility of change with new knowledge. Introduced in Paper C. 
View or architecture view [6]: Work product expressing the architecture of a system from 
the perspective of specific system concerns. 
Viewpoint or architecture viewpoint [6]: Work product establishing the conventions for 
the construction, interpretation and use of architecture views to frame specific system con-
cerns. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of the colloquially known autonomous driving, or the practical automation 
of the dynamic driving task (DDT) [4], has been around for many years now. As early as the 
1960s, there have been visions of a future where cars could drive themselves and the drivers 
could be passengers instead using the time saved for more productive purposes. In the mid-
90s researchers at Carnegie Mellon University claimed to have driven over 6000 steering 
miles autonomously [10], and similar claims were made by researchers from Universitat der 
Bundeswehr München [11]. However, as the reality of the complexity of the task emerged, 
many of these ideas faded away and automated driving remained seemingly out of reach. 
Though there have been pushes in the direction of automated driving in the past, a major 
change that has facilitated the most recent one is the increase in the performance of sensory 
technologies and computing power allowing development of algorithms to enable machine 
inference in real-time. While there have been many prototypes of automated vehicles demon-
strated both in academia [12] and in industry [13] [14], these are typically still in various 
levels of development and as of late 2017, no OEM has a highly or fully automated on-road 
vehicle that has been series produced.  
To reach the goal of profitable series-production, the automated functions must be inte-
grated within the complex vehicular architectures most OEMs use today. Modern vehicular 
architectures differ greatly from their predecessors from about a couple of decades ago where 
only a few components, if any, were controlled electronically. These individually controlled 
embedded systems have since transformed into progressively larger interconnected distrib-
uted systems, to the point that a modern vehicle may have greater than 100 separate Elec-
tronic Control Units (ECUs) providing close to about 300 functions of value to the user. In 
the cost sensitive automotive domain, the maintenance of these functions, hardware and soft-
ware components, into structured product lines i.e. creating a platform of reusable compo-
nents, brings an additional dimension of complexity.  
Platform based development, cost, functional safety, and their influence on the process of 
architecting automated driving in Heavy Commercial Vehicles (HGVs), were some of the 
main drivers behind the Swedish national research (Vinnova-FFI) project ARCHER [15]. 
ARCHER was started as a joint effort between KTH and Scania CV AB and has been the 
main source of funding for this work. The goals of the project are as follows: 
“The overall goal for this project is to develop methods and principles 
and a reference system architecture enabling safe, secure and cost-effi-
cient fully automated heavy vehicles. The “deliverable” is further de-
scribed as a system architecture description that incorporates an architec-
tural realization of the safety concepts, testability mechanisms, necessary 
to show the feasibility of building a fully automated heavy vehicle, exhibit-
ing sufficient robustness to provide realistic availability of operation in the 
considered operational scenario. The reference system architecture has 
the goal to improve on existing prototype systems for various levels of 
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automated driving by, 1) not assuming any operator presence, and, 2) be-
ing feasible for series production of commercial vehicles.” [15] 
This thesis, as a part of ARCHER, focusses on methodologies for architecting in the con-
text of automated driving, functional safety, and industrialization concerns such as cost and 
reuse of legacy. Figure 1 shows a high-level view of the scope. As an overarching idea, this 
thesis views automation to be an add-on to an existing platform of components, aims to iden-
tify the challenges in integrating automation into the platform in a functionally safe way, and 
to define methods, processes, and tools to ameliorate these challenges. To this end, while the 
work presented in the papers is often performed in the context of automated driving and 
heavily utilizes the core principles of automated driving and the technologies involved, the 
focus remains squarely on the methodologies for architecting. The methodology presented 
in this thesis is designed for industrial usage and defines the architectural viewpoint [6] of 
Functional Safety to create the view of  Preliminary Architectural Assumptions (PAA) com-
plying with the current dominant functional safety standard ISO 26262 [7]. 
 
Figure 1: Focus of this Thesis 
  
Assumptions and Delimitations   |   3 
 
 
1.1 Assumptions and Delimitations 
Due to the rather broad range of the topics involved, several delimitations had to be made 
on the scope of this work. It is useful to take a pause here to clarify what assumptions were 
made and what the thesis will not be about. 
This work relates only to on-road vehicles and thus, does not take into consideration other 
automated vehicles that work in more constrained environments, such as Autonomous 
Guided Vehicles in factories, automated trains etc.  
A delimitation of this work is that it is intended to be applied to the concept phase in the 
development lifecycle and looks at architecture from a functional perspective. Thus, imple-
mentation or technology specific considerations such as the choice of processor specific ar-
chitectures, which are choices made in the latter phases of development, are out of scope. 
There are assumptions of a middleware being used (as is common in the industry see e.g. 
AUTOSAR [16]) that will be able to isolate the functionality of automation from the hard-
ware implementation details as is common in the industry, but a specific choice of middle-
ware is not made. While considering legacy systems such as in Paper B or judging the tech-
nological options available for a use-case and feasibility of implementation, it is sometimes 
unavoidable to investigate the details of the technology itself. Paper C touches on this topic 
as well from the abstraction of architectural decisions. However, these technological points 
can get very detailed (see for example - [17] for considerations on radar technologies) and 
care has been taken to keep the ideas behind paper B and C independent of technology spe-
cifics as far as possible.  
Safety, particularly functional safety, is the primary extra functional concern of this thesis 
and others such as security of automated systems, though considered for e.g. in the case stud-
ies are not the focus of this work. Issues regarding functional safety that are not related to 
architecting in the concept phase e.g. tool-qualification etc. are not specifically investigated. 
The focus remained on faults and safety measures, related to hazardous events and the move-
ment of the vehicle - for example, collisions and not fires caused due to burnt fuses. A similar 
delimitation on the evaluation of completeness or correctness of requirements, in that they 
are assumed to be correct for the purposes of this thesis. 
In terms of architecting itself, an assumption is that a functional view of the legacy plat-
form architecture is available in that it describes a set of functional components and the in-
teractions between them. Detailed issues regarding the modelling of the legacy components, 
such as architecture recovery, are not considered within this thesis. The focus remains on the 
bigger picture. Similarly, the variability of these components is not explicitly considered 
within this work. Automated driving is assumed to be introduced to the platform in stages 
that bring in progressively higher levels of automation to progressively larger parts of the 
platform. 
Some details regarding automated driving such as the ethics, morality, legality, and social 
desirability of automated driving are left out as research topics of their own. The infamous 
trolley problem etc. are thus out of scope and not part of this thesis. The case studies primarily 
drew the system boundary at a single truck and do not include the aspects of intelligent 
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transport systems, or even platooning, eschewing the system of systems view of thinking and 
avoiding the dependencies on communication between vehicles.  
1.2 Thesis Outline and Reading Guide 
Drawing from ISO 42010 [6], this thesis defines the PAA as a view of the architecture 
governed by the concern of functional safety and delivers a methodology for architecting the 
PAA.  
This thesis is organized in the following way: Section 2 gives an overview of terms and 
challenges to set the context for the specific aims of the thesis in Section 3. Section 4 then 
describes the research design, methods and limitations allowing section 5 to focus on the 
content of the paper itself. Section 5 will provide a concise summary of the included papers 
and a description of how the papers tie together as part of a greater whole. Section 6 concludes 
with a summary of the impact and the directions of future work.  
Though the thesis is intended to be read in the order presented, some readers may be in-
terested in only a subset of the topics addressed. A guide to the important parts of the thesis 
is as follows:  
- For the basis of the research itself, Section 3.2 presents the research questions and 
Section 4 details its philosophical aspects, choice of methodology, threats for validity 
etc.  
- For a primer on the different fields this thesis touches upon, Sections 1, 2 and 3.1 are 
important. 
- For the identified challenges, refer to Sections 2.4, 3.1 and Paper A. 
- For an overview of the related work, see Section 3.3.  
- For the main contributions, the reader is directed to Sections 3.4 for the definition of 
the Functional Safety viewpoint and Section 5.4 for a discussion of how the various 
parts of the thesis tie together into a methodology.  
- Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 provide summaries of the included papers.   
- The appended papers at the end of the thesis, provide additional details about the usage 
and contribution 
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2. Background and Context 
This section will describe the background of legacy platforms, ISO 26262, automated 
driving, and the role of the driver in design of the platform, setting the context for the rest of 
the thesis.  
Human factors and errors have been known to be the overwhelming cause of accidents 
when judged in comparison to vehicular and environmental factors, e.g. about 93% of the 
total in the study in [18]. While automation essentially replaces the human driver, ideally 
removing the human factors of the driving task involved, it must be noted that the automation 
is not infallible, and the complexity of the newly added components and their interactions 
will add new ways for failures to occur. 
The state of California in the United States mandates the reporting of disengagements i.e.  
“A deactivation of the autonomous mode when a failure of the autonomous 
technology is detected or when the safe operation of the vehicle requires that the 
autonomous vehicle test driver disengage the autonomous mode and take imme-
diate manual control of the vehicle. ” [19]. 
Waymo inc., the spinoff from Google, was arguably the best performer from the reporting 
of miles driven in 2017 by the various organizations who test automated driving in California 
with an impressive number of only 0.178 disengagements for every 1000 miles driven [20]. 
The impressiveness of the figure diminishes however, when the numbers are taken in context 
e.g. that about 3.2 trillion miles were driven in the United States in 2016 according to official 
statistics [21]. Not all disengagements lead to an accident, but they do indicate a potential for 
one, if there is no driver ready to respond. Small numbers of faults seen in testing may have 
drastic impact at the scales of operation on transition from a prototype to a product. This is a 
fundamental reason to have a systematic approach to functional safety. The following sub-
sections will detail the current state of practice in the industry. 
2.1 Legacy Platforms and HGVs 
The automotive industry has seen modern vehicles transform slowly but steadily from a 
purely mechanical design to the complex software-intensive cyber physical system it is today. 
The modern automotive platform can have about 100 physically disparate ECUs providing 
about 300 functions distributed across them and it was estimated in 2006 that about 40% of 
the in-production costs can be attributed to software [22]. This evolution has led to modern 
cars being fitted with tens of millions of lines of code and large parameter sets, see e.g. [23].  
A visualization of the code base of a single 2013 Scania vehicle, Figure 2, shows about 1400 
points that represent the functional elements (each functional element being a part of a func-
tion) connected by about 15000 lines representing their communication dependencies, shows 
the scale of penetration of software. The statistics refer to a pre-automation era of automotive 
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platforms and automation is predicted to increase the functionality and the complexity of E/E 
systems used in the automotive industry.  
Modern vehicular platforms are additionally characterized by high variability caused by 
the customization to satisfy customer needs. Each customization or new feature adds costs 
which are an important concern in the automotive domain [24]. Platforms have thus evolved 
in the form of systematically handling product variability with product lines and families to 
save costs [25]. A single vehicle, such as the truck from Figure 2, is just one of the variants 
possible to be created from a single product line, which is in turn part of a larger product 
family. Suitable reading on the topic of variability may be found in [26]. A HGV is seen as 
a tool providing services of value to a customer and is heavily customized according to the 
customer’s business needs be it in hardware, software, or mechanical components. Other 
considerations that are unique to HGVs, such as vehicles being repurposed in the aftermarket 
for an entirely different purpose etc., typically add the possibility for a customer to optimize 
for total lifecycle costs. A larger discussion of lifecycle costs at the customer and how that 
affects engineering decisions during design can be found in [27]. The need to isolate common 
functionality for the purposes of variability and the mechatronic nature of the automotive 
domain, i.e. the tight coupling between the mechanical components and the E/E systems that 
control them, has led to a pattern of ECUs connected over busses, implementing related parts 
of several distributed functions [28]. 
Figure 2: Visualization of the Complexity of a Platform; Courtesy of Scania C.V. 
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Changes to a particular distributed function could influence others due to their shared 
hardware platform dependencies. Platform based design such as described in [29] is a core 
tenet in the automotive industry and architects have to optimize the architecture across a 
larger scope, rather than a single vehicle. Axelsson in [30] describes two types of architecting 
processes, revolutionary and evolutionary, which differ in the scale of their efforts. An evo-
lutionary step is taken in the daily work of the architects when the architecture is modified to 
respond to smaller stimuli such as changes to requirements. A revolutionary step is a usually 
a planned response to a bigger stimulus and considers the platform as a whole, dimensioning 
it for the future. This thesis considers the introduction of automated driving to be a revolu-
tionary change to the vehicular platforms and sees this as a motivating factor for the use of a 
structured methodology.  
2.2 ISO 26262 and the Safety Lifecycle 
The extra-functional property of safety has always been deeply connected to the automo-
tive world. Recognizing the trend of the increasing complexity of E/E systems and greater 
dependence on software in the automotive industry, emphasis has been placed in recent years 
in the assurance of safety in the presence of functional failures within the system i.e. func-
tional safety. The current de-facto standard for functional safety within the automotive do-
main is ISO 26262 [7], an automotive specific specialization of the “meta-standard” for safety 
IEC 61508 [31]. Despite known issues of using ISO 26262 such as 1) the current edition of 
ISO 26262 not being applicable to HGVs and 2) debate on the applicability of the standard 
for automated vehicles [32], the standard remains the closest “fit” and the main alternative to 
analyse functional safety until the publication of SOTIF [9],  intended as a complement to 
ISO 26262, is available.  
 Functional safety within the standard, is treated as the absence of unreasonable risk due 
to hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E systems. ISO 26262 gives a high-level 
reference lifecycle, and detailed processes for technical development that need to be fol-
lowed, to ensure functional safety of an Item being developed. An overview of the lifecycle 
and processes, is seen in Figure 3.  
A safety case, i.e. the argument that the safety requirements are complete and satisfied by 
evidence, is the desired result of applying ISO 26262 in development. Evidence is obtained 
by generating work products that fulfil the requirements set by the standard. The requirements 
are designed for the identification and mitigation of hazards related to malfunctioning behav-
iour of the system under consideration in the concept, product development, production, and 
operation phases. This thesis limits itself to the tasks in the concept phase and the following 
subsections summarize parts of the standard that are the most relevant to this thesis.  
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Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
The definition of the Item is the starting point within the safety lifecycle. An Item is the 
system or array of systems that implements functionality at a vehicle level, serves as a de-
marcation of where ISO 26262 will be applied. Once the item has been sufficiently defined 
in terms of the requirements stated in clause 5.4.1 of the standard, the “hazard analysis and 
risk assessment” step is initiated to systematically identify hazards and analyse the risk pre-
sented by them. As a means of risk assessment, ASIL classification is then performed by 
assigning the Severity (S), Exposure (E) and the Controllability (C) of the hazard to one of 
their pre-determined classes. An ASIL classification is then made according to the scheme 
shown in Table 1, where ASIL classifications are indicated in red. A safety goal is formulated 
for each hazardous event that was not classified QM. Safety goals act as the top-level safety 
requirements for an item and all safety requirements through the lifecycle are derived from 
these.  
Table 1: Scheme for ASIL Classification; Adapted from ISO 26262 [7] 
Severity 
class 
Probability 
class 
Controllability class 
C1 C2 C3 
S1 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM QM 
E3 QM QM A 
E4 QM A B 
S2 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM A 
E3 QM A B 
E4 A B C 
S3 
E1 QM QM A 
E2 QM A B 
E3 A B C 
E4 B C D 
Functional Safety Concept and the Preliminary Architectural Assumptions 
The objective of the Functional Safety Concept (FSC) is to derive Functional Safety Re-
quirements (FSRs) derived from safety goals, and allocate them to the elements of the 
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Preliminary Architecture (PA) or to external measures ensuring that the safety goals are met. 
The FSC addresses the fault detection, mitigation, arbitration logics and available safety 
measures to argue for the safety of the concept chosen. The aim at this stage in the lifecycle 
is to establish implementation-independent safety behaviour to ensure that the safety goals 
are met. The PA is assumed, in the standard, to be delivered by available with a similar im-
plementation-independent behaviour. ISO 26262 tends to use the terms PA and PAA inter-
changeably. A distinction is made in this thesis between the collection of elements of the 
architecture (PA), from the view governed by the Functional Safety viewpoint defined in 3.4 
(PAA).  The FSRs inherit the ASILs from the SGs they are derived from, and the elements 
the FSRs are allocated to are developed according to the rigour of that ASIL level.  
Requirement Decomposition and ASIL Tailoring 
Higher ASIL requirements being allocated to elements have a direct implication to the 
cost of the development efforts due to the rigour associated with their development. In many 
cases it may be advantageous to use a “tool” provided by ISO 26262 Clause 9-5, namely the 
“decomposition of requirements with respect to ASIL tailoring”, more commonly known as 
ASIL decomposition. ASIL decomposition allows a single requirement to be broken down 
into two redundant ones with each having lower ASIL than the one they were decomposed 
from, on the basis that there are sufficiently independent architectural elements available to 
individually fulfil the requirements. The list of allowed ASIL decompositions is as follows: 
ASIL D -> ASIL C (D) + ASIL A (D) 
ASIL D -> ASIL B (D) + ASIL B (D) 
ASIL C -> ASIL B (C) + ASIL A (C) 
ASIL B -> ASIL A (B) + ASIL A (B) 
ASIL <Any level> -> ASIL <Any level> + QM 
ASIL decomposition can be applied at any stage in the development of the product and 
serves as an indispensable tool for an architect to address scenarios such as cases where, (1) 
it may be impossible for complex elements to meet the rigour needed by a high ASIL level, 
(2) it may be too expensive to meet the rigour needed by a high ASIL level or, (3) the element 
that needs to be integrated may not have been developed according to ISO 26262. If correctly 
used, ASIL decomposition can be used to tailor the ASIL classified requirements to match 
the capabilities of the elements in the item and potentially save costs. A guide to proper usage 
of ASIL decomposition along with common mistakes made in this process can be found in 
[33]. ASIL decomposition serves as an important motivating factor in the studies in Paper B,  
(deriving information about legacy components to identify how they should be used in a new 
context) and Paper C (using the information gathered to justify the predicted absence of sin-
gle point failures) due to its cost saving potential.  
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2.3 Driving Automation 
In popular opinion, automated driving is set to bring in a new era of accident and conges-
tion free roads, greater urban land use with reimagined cities, better resource usage and 
greater productivity for everyone. According to the research and advisory firm Gartner,  that 
assesses the maturity, adoption and the social application of new and emerging technologies, 
automated driving is starting to leave the top of the Gartner hype curve in 2017 [34]. This 
move from the top, in Gartner’s methodology indicates a small step towards the maturity of 
the technology and more realistic expectations from investors and society. But considering 
that this has been a very hot-topic for the last few years and there are different views on what 
automated driving is, and on its nature, it is useful to establish the definition of automated 
driving within this work.  
Automation in the purest sense of the word exists in many forms already in most modern 
vehicles. In most cases the automation is limited in combinations of responsibility or duration 
or the Operational Design Domain (ODD). There are for example, advanced ADAS func-
tions that take control of the vehicle when enabled by the user (such as in the case of Adaptive 
Cruise Control functions), or active safety functions such as the AEB (legally mandated for 
trucks [5]) that while enabled all the time, only overrides the driver’s commands for a short 
time under specific conditions. Many OEMs also have released a limited “autopilot” func-
tionality that takes over the task of driving for sustained periods under highway conditions. 
A common characteristic to these functions is that the driver is always responsible. Current 
legal frameworks in most countries that follow the Vienna convention [35] are also built 
under this assumption that the driver, however assisted, is responsible for the safety of the 
vehicle and other road users.  
There have been a few previous attempts at classifying automation such as by the German 
federal highway research institute (BASt) [36] and American National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration NHTSA [37]; these have been deprecated in favour of the SAE levels 
of automation defined in SAE J3016. Table 2 shows the differences in the various terms used. 
Automation referred to in this thesis deals only with SAE levels 3-5 of automated driving 
characterized in that while the ADS is engaged, it is simultaneously responsible for: 
i. complete lateral and longitudinal control of the vehicle in accordance with road 
rules. 
ii. the monitoring of the environment for other road users and hazards 
iii. the monitoring of the environment to ensure that it is still within its ODD 
iv. the monitoring of vehicle performance 
v. taking appropriate action to avoid hazardous events 
vi. transitioning to (or attempting to transition) a minimal risk condition in case of a 
situation it cannot handle 
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Table 2: SAE Levels of Driving Automation; Adapted from [4] 
S
A
E
 L
e
v
e
l 
Name 
DDT 
DDT 
fallback 
ODD 
BaST 
Level 
NHTSA 
Level 
Sustained lat-
eral and lon-
gitudinal ve-
hicle motion 
control 
OEDR 
Driver performs part or all of the DDT   
  
  
0 
No Driving 
Automation 
Driver Driver Driver n/a Driver only 0 
1 
Driver Assis-
tance 
Driver and Sys-
tem 
Driver Driver Limited Assisted 1 
2 
Partial Driving 
Automation 
System Driver Driver Limited 
Partially au-
tomated 
2 
ADS (“System”) performs the entire DDT (while en-
gaged) 
  
 
 
3 
Conditional 
Driving Auto-
mation 
System System 
Fallback- 
ready user 
Limited 
Highly auto-
mated 
3 
4 
High Driving 
Automation 
System System System Limited 
Fully auto-
mated 
3/4 
5 
Full Driving 
Automation 
System System System Unlimited n/a 
 
Another way of looking at the delimitation of SAE L3-5 being the focus of this thesis is 
that the driver is no longer involved in the supervision of the function of the ADS. Thus, the 
ADS must be capable of handling failures that may occur since the driver cannot be relied 
upon to act immediately. The significance of this choice is expanded upon in the next sub-
section. 
2.4 Role of the Driver 
The introduction of driving automation is driven partly by the potential to improve acci-
dent statistics; traffic statistics from the U.S.A. show that the mean time between crashes that 
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cause injuries is about 50,000 vehicle hours [38]. The role of the driver in a vehicle will 
change significantly with driving automation, from operator to supervisor of the driving task, 
requiring taking over control only in case of situations that are beyond the scope of the ADS. 
The consequences of such a role change are non-trivial and parallels can be found in the 
domains, where automation is more mature, such as industrial processes where Bainbridge 
in [39] notes that reliance on automation may reduce the operator’s skills. This translates to 
a greater potential for risk, if and when the ADS requests a takeover of the DDT by the driver. 
Parasuraman and Riley in [40] suggest that though automation may reduce operator error, it 
may instead leave the system more vulnerable to designer error. In the specific context of the 
automotive domain, a careful analysis of the impact of replacing the driver with the ADI is 
needed to minimize the errors in design. There are implications to the architecting process 
itself that require a reconsideration of how development is done today. Some of the ways the 
driver affects the development of the platform are described in the following subsections. 
Comfort 
Traditionally, there has been emphasis on the comfort of the driver over performance or 
other extra-functional requirements, e.g. the frequency of operation for an electric motor may 
be adjusted for human comfort, packaging of elements to fit aesthetics of the cabin, cabin 
climate control systems, etc. With the absence of the driver in automated vehicles, many of 
these design choices made will eventually be revisited. This is especially true in the case of 
HGVs where in the common tasks of delivering goods, despite large design compromises 
being made for the presence of the driver, he/she is more of an unavoidable necessity than a 
need. The removal of the driver gives an opportunity to revisit design choices that were not 
available before, leading to a larger design space. 
Complexity 
Brooks in [41] describes two different types of complexity, accidental and essential. Es-
sential complexity is the complexity that is inherent to the application due to its nature and 
accidental complexity is a by-product of choices made in the design process. The ADS will 
need to perform at a similar level as a highly trained human driver to ensure safety (a complex 
task in itself) i.e. the Essential Complexity of the task but achieving it will create dependen-
cies between the other parts of the platform and require more stringent verification than what 
is needed today i.e. the Accidental Complexity.  
Minimal Risk Condition 
ISO 26262 requires that a safe state be achieved in case of a fault that could lead to a 
hazardous event. A safe state in the case of a fault in the ADS is addressed in the J3016 as 
the Minimal Risk Condition. What this means in practical terms is that the ADS will need to 
have redundant measures built in across most of its elements such that no single fault will 
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stop it from achieving a Minimal Risk Condition, further adding to the complexity of the 
platform. 
Controllability 
Controllability within ISO 26262 currently refers to the ability of the driver or others at 
risk, to act and mitigate the severity of a hazardous event. As seen in Table 1, a higher con-
trollability can reduce the ASIL level assigned to a particular hazardous event. The absence 
of a human driver monitoring and taking immediate action in case of a hazardous event means 
that 1) the ADS will unavoidably have requirements with high ASIL classification and 2) 
legacy elements from the platform that the ADS will rely on will have to be reanalysed as 
they will inherit higher ASIL requirements than they were originally designed for. Thus, the 
complex platform will have to perform with a higher integrity which will lead to higher costs.  
Detectability vs Robustness 
In a similar vein to that of Controllability discussed in the previous subsection, there has 
also been reliance placed on the driver’s ability to detect a hazardous event. If a fault or its 
effects is detected by a driver in time, it becomes easier to control. E.g. a short circuit in an 
infotainment system may be detected immediately by software but that it has led to a fire can 
only be measured by a well-placed sensor in the platform. Thus, the driver’s replacement 
affects the platform in more ways than just the absence of a controller, since the OEM will 
be responsible for the safety of the passengers and goods it carries, reusing legacy systems 
need to be reanalysed for this loss of detectability. Essentially, this means that legacy systems 
cannot be reused directly as off-the-shelf components and that new elements may needed to 
be added to the platform that have never been used before, e.g. auditory sensors to triangulate 
the location of an emergency vehicle.  
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3. Research Objectives 
This chapter describes the approach taken in this thesis and the reasoning behind it. Sec-
tion 3.1 gives brief overview of design decisions, and a problem formulation in the intermin-
gling of architecting and safety. Section 3.2 then defines the specific research questions, fol-
lowed by a discussion of the related work on the topic in Section 3.3. This section ends by 
with Section 3.4 defining the viewpoint that will be used in the rest of this thesis. 
3.1 Problem Formulation  
The nature of architecting limits the level of formalization possible in the design of a 
complex platform. There is thus a need for an “optimum” amount of rigour in the process of 
architecting, that adds value in the context of safety-critical systems and automated driving, 
while not impeding the momentum of development. 
The multi-dimensional nature of architecting has been described by Rechtin in [42], as an 
art as much as it is a science. Architecting automotive platforms requires consideration of not 
only the properties of the needed function but also requires a pragmatic approach to cost, the 
competences in the organization, knowledge of target markets, potential future functional 
needs, limitations from legacy etc. As a result, the solution chosen is often a compromise 
between the various requirements. An architect must judge these numerous factors, often 
under the presence of uncertainty in the information, and make design decisions that will 
influence the platform for years to come. Since many of the issues trade-off against each 
other and are difficult to define, e.g. technology competencies in an organization, a formali-
zation of the process of architecting remains equally difficult, and the design space prohibi-
tively large. Architectural exploration strategies and their limitations have been covered more 
in detail in [43] where the authors attempt to summarize the gaps between industry and aca-
demia in the adoption of automated architectural exploration. A consequence of the lack of 
automated architectural exploration is that manual methods are frequently used in the auto-
motive industry for architecting, see e.g. [44], [45], and [24], and architectural decisions are 
made frequently as a result of consensus amongst the stakeholders. While consensus has been 
sufficient in the past, the implications of automated driving on functional safety is set to 
change that. The absence of the driver availability in the case of unanticipated faults puts 
greater requirements on the rigour of design while simultaneously greatly increasing the 
scope where greater rigour is required.  
Some of the design decisions are related to the core of automated driving such as the 
decision of the acceptable levels of braking or the acceptable sensor configurations in specific 
situations. Other decisions may be auxiliary to functionality on, (a) how to assure that the 
tyre threads have sufficient depth before allowing automated driving to be enabled, or (b) if 
an ECU not involved in automated driving should be redesigned to be restarted if it starts 
consuming too much power during operation. Both are examples of decisions that are rele-
vant to automated driving in an indirect way as they could indirectly influence functionality 
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of the ADI because of a change in dynamics (a) or in power available to the ADI (b). A larger 
discussion on the reuse of legacy Elements in the context of Driving Automation is found in 
Paper B. Decisions may also be made based on the availability of technology e.g. by selecting 
a scanning LiDAR with moving mechanical parts (compromising on a lifetime requirement), 
instead of waiting for the technological maturity of the alternative Flash LiDARs. A compo-
nent could be selected based on current availability, even if it does not fulfil a requirement 
of the ADI, by reducing the scope of the function. E.g. it is easier to achieve automated 
driving in a particular scenario if the maximum speed is limited, if the route is fixed, or if it 
is only allowed to drive under clear weather conditions.  
The increase in the complexity of the platform with the ADI, and the fast pace of technol-
ogy progress, also means that design decisions need to be more frequently revisited during 
the lifecycle of the platform, and assumptions or choices made in the past could be invalidated 
based on new information. E.g. It could be found in testing that, due to the positioning of its 
placement, a camera may be affected by water sprays in certain markets, rendering it inef-
fective 40% of the time during operation. It is clear that this causes the functionality of the 
ADI to degrade, but what may be less obvious is that this also affects the safety argumenta-
tion.  
A safety case covers not only the individual work products which are the evidence for 
compliance but also the argumentation connecting them showing why they are complete and 
correct [46]. Suppose that the safety argumentation requires the side camera and a radar to 
be redundantly monitoring a particular area, would this redundancy be truly valid if the cam-
era were unavailable 40% of the time? A solution could be to reposition the camera; this 
could have cascading effects on the algorithm used for classification of objects, or on the 
transient errors seen due to a change in the length of the cabling required to reach the new 
position.  An alternative solution to reposition the camera, could be to install a wiping system 
with the camera housing, controlled by another ECU. This could lead to larger power con-
sumption, new control logic requirements, another ECU that must fulfil ASIL classified re-
quirements etc. A design decision made in the absence of concrete test results as is frequently 
done in the industry, relies heavily on assumptions made by architects.  
Assumptions made on the behaviour of the driver or other road users also affect the safety 
argumentations. E.g. assumptions on how other road users would react if the ADI switched 
on hazard lights, or how should conflicting hand signals from cyclists should be interpreted, 
could affect the controllability measure of a hazardous event. Decisions on core components 
could also be made based on assumptions e.g. assuming that any emergency vehicle will 
communicate over a V2V channel and broadcast its location, could eliminate the need for 
using auditory sensors mentioned in Section 2.4.  
Unless these design decisions, assumptions and rationale are traced and followed up in a 
systematic way with methods relevant to the context, there is a chance that it could lead to a 
larger cost or a lower level of safety.  Safety is a system level property, thus focussing on a 
top down design like the one advocated by ISO 26262 requires making assumptions about 
the functioning of the underlying elements. A more detailed analysis of the problem of un-
certain information in architecting and its sources can be found in Paper C. According to the 
beliefs of this author, the need for formalization from the perspective of safety and the limited 
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means of the architecting process to provide this information is a fundamental tension be-
tween the two perspectives. While it may never be possible to formalize every aspect of the 
process of architecting, it can indeed be helped by defined and repeatable ways of working 
that make the tacit assumptions made during the architecting process, visible and reviewable. 
A methodology for the systematic architecting of automotive platforms is thus, of critical 
importance.  
3.2 Research Questions 
Part A 
The need for to identify challenges for architecting automated vehicles from the perspec-
tives of safety, business, verification, and validation was considered necessary to scope the 
work. To determine how the ADI can use the legacy platform, to elicit challenges from the 
perspectives identified, and to explore the tensions between the perspectives, the research 
question addressed in Paper A was defined. 
 What are the implications of the ways that the ADI can be cou-
pled with legacy platforms? 
Part B 
ISO 26262 is the de-facto standard for functional safety in the automotive domain and 
provides a reference lifecycle to identify and mitigate risk in vehicular functions. The stand-
ard prescribes a top down approach for development of safety critical systems that, while 
ideal for development of a new system, poses significant challenges for the traditional auto-
motive industry practice of reusing existing elements for cost efficiency [24]. The PAA is the 
first architectural work product in the workflow standard and thus, the ideal point to begin 
exploratory studies about managing architecting under uncertainty, and the reuse of legacy 
platforms. Section 3.4 of this thesis defines the PAA as view of the governing Functional 
Safety viewpoint and uses it as a basis to answer the following research questions: 
 How can detailed domain specific information about legacy sub-
systems be extracted from the platform for the purposes of design of 
the PAA? 
 How can the decision making of architects under uncertain in-
formation be managed to achieve the traceability needed for design of 
safety critical systems? 
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RQ2 and RQ3 have been addressed in Paper C with the creation of the process ATRIUM. 
RQ2 has in addition been addressed in Paper B with the method M1.   
3.3 Related Work 
The work presented in this thesis is inherently multidisciplinary and even with the delim-
itations set in Section 1.1, several discourses in the academic community are touched upon 
such as Design Space Exploration, the reuse of legacy systems, Software and Architecting, 
Safety and Certification, Dependability, Verification and Validation, Autonomic Systems, 
design sciences etc. As a result, it is an enormous task to coherently summarize each of these 
discourses to position this work and thus, this work does not presume to claim full coverage 
of the State of the art. 
 An attempt is made in this section to instead summarize those parts of the related work 
that are of specific relevance to the areas highlighted in Figure 1. To this end, Part A gives a 
summary of architectures for automation that were found to be interesting in that they had 
either received significant acceptance, judged by citations, or were representative of a larger 
set of papers. Part B focusses on the subset of papers that were relevant to dealing with un-
certainty in the decision-making process from the software architecture community. Other 
relevant papers that are not from these discourses to this work are cited as reading guides 
throughout this thesis as and when their topics are considered.  
Part A: Identification of challenges 
This thesis aims to address the challenges in architecting automated systems as a primary 
goal. Due to this papers that addressed automated systems as a whole, from a functional 
perspective were chosen over others that discussed or improved upon some of the compo-
nents of automated driving; For example, papers that primarily address object recognition 
and tracking algorithms, or risk aware planners etc., are not included in this section even 
though they are considered critical components.  
Several publications exist that discuss the architectures of automated driving from a func-
tional perspective. Reference architectures exist as generalizations for automated systems 
such as MAPE-K [47], OODA [3] as well as domain specific architectures that focus on the 
needs from a particular domain.  NASREM [48], is a typical example of the Sense-Plan-Act 
paradigm which has found application in the robotics domain [49], while the 4D/RCS refer-
ence architecture, an example for unmanned ground vehicles can be found in [50]. For a 
review of automotive specific reference architectures, the reader is referred to the work of 
Gordon et al. [51] and Behere [52]. Successful and practical instances of automated driving, 
judged by their application to real-world case studies, can be found in large research projects 
such as HAVEit [53], OEM initiatives similar to the Bertha vehicle in [13], participants of 
competitions such as the DARPA challenges like the “Junior” team in [54], other competi-
tions such as the Hyundai autonomous vehicle competitions [55]. Notwithstanding papers 
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such as [56], which propose fail silent architectural measures to eliminate the need for me-
chanical backup and those like [57], that are aimed at specific subsystems (and not the entire 
platform), a limitation seen in these is that they are too application itself rather than the in-
teraction with the rest of the automotive platform. While a platform can consist of more than 
just automation, e.g. subsystems that keep sensors cleaned or climate systems that maintain 
the comfort of the occupants etc., these are not typically considered even though they could 
potentially affect the operation of the ADI. Another limitation is they do not emphasize on 
the integration of the ADI into a legacy platform, arguably the more common scenario, and 
are limited to the achievement of the ADS functionality. 
Part B: Architecting under uncertainty and reuse of legacy 
The principles setting the context for the research questions are not themselves new. Ru-
panov et al. [58], amongst others, advocate the early integration of safety into design. Sierla 
et al. discuss the use of functional failure propagation to reduce the risk associated with sys-
tem design early in the lifecycle, in a way similar to Paper C though without any particular 
safety standard for guidance [59]. The advantages of using early integration of safety were 
experienced first-hand by the author in [60], where the use of safety analysis helped structure 
the architectural design decisions .  
Architecting methods for design and evaluation of architecture such as SAAM [61] and 
ATAM [2] are commonly found in literature. Survey papers of this topic can be found in the 
works of Dobrica and Niemela in [62], and the authors of  [63]. Babar et al. in [64] also 
present and compare some of the most popular methods in the field, where they come to the 
conclusion that ATAM is the only one of the considered options that gives detailed guidelines 
to deal with process issues such as reusability of artefacts, identified risks, scenarios etc. In 
the initial stages of this work, ATAM was pursued as an option and an attempt was made in 
the analysis of an automated function with the ATAM attributes augmented with the addi-
tional attribute of safety. Though there have been successful cases of the use of ATAM within 
the automotive context e.g. in Wallin et al. [65]  where a method using ATAM is used in 
decision making for an integration strategy, our attempt unfortunately did not yield successful 
results. A detailed review of what went wrong with this experiment was not performed but 
the opinion of the participants was that there was too much overhead compared to the previ-
ous process of consensus amongst experts. The DSL used for architectural modelling within 
Scania was not designed to support documentation in the ABAS style recommended by 
ATAM. To reverse-engineer a view based on the ABAS style required involvement from a 
large number of experts, from many different subsystems, which was challenging to organize. 
Another probable cause could have been the overwhelming nature of the attribute of safety 
as an inviolable constraint that affected large parts of the platform.  
A consequence of the failed application of ATAM was however, a greater understanding 
of the needs of the methods sought within the ARCHER project. It was found that primary 
focus needed to be in centred on the early stage design of the architectures for automated 
driving reusing as much of the legacy systems as possible while not violating the require-
ments for safety. Also noted was the importance of handling the uncertainty related to the 
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vast changes, that automated driving was due to bring. Of particular concern were the deci-
sions made on whether legacy subsystems were to be reused; and if so, if they needed to be 
modified to be reusable out of their initial design context.  
The study of what constitutes a PAA has been quite limited and fragmented. Searches for 
the exact phrase “Preliminary Architectural Assumptions” in Google Scholar resulted in only 
about 40 papers being found. Several papers discussed trends in safety research but only a 
few discussed the PAA itself. The following is a sampling of papers that discussed the PAA 
and the characterization of their usage. In terms of definitions, the closest were in [66] where 
Galina et al. discuss commonalities between ISO 26262, IEC 61508 and ASPICE and Ta-
gliabó et al in [67] who equate the purpose of the PAA to the EAST-ADL Analysis Archi-
tecture description. While a few papers discussed the PAA elements in functional terms such 
as [68], [69]and [70], others such as Taylor et al. in [71] seemingly incorporated hardware 
elements as well. Westman and Nyberg in [72] use software elements as their building blocks 
and [73] even include the mechanical considerations such as installation space. A common 
feature amongst all the papers that were studied is that they did not elaborate how the PAA 
they used, was generated. Thus, there is seemingly no consensus within the literature on 
what the PAA should contain i.e. the definition of the PAA or the methods needed to create 
it.  
The aim of analysing the architecture of a software system is to predict the quality of a 
system before it has been built; not to establish precise estimates but to examine the principal 
effects of an architecture [74]. The focus on the level of effects rather than precise estimates 
or calculations is a reason for the proliferation of heuristics in the field of architectural design. 
The seminal work of Rechtin and Meier [75] describe the use of heuristics as a basic tool in 
architecting and works such as [76] have established the effectiveness of using heuristics and 
the prevalence of such methods in day to day decision making, emphasizing the acceptance 
of small errors to avoid large mistakes. Maier in [77] discusses the use of heuristics in a 
progressive fashion from more descriptive to more prescriptive domain-specific heuristics, 
before the development of quantitative and rational metrics. Heuristic based guidelines have 
been used in Paper B to satisfactory results. 
The need for documentation of not just the requirements of a system but also the design 
decisions-, their assumptions and rationale underlying these decisions has been described 
in [78], where Leveson discusses her construct of Intent Specifications. This concept is al-
ready prevalent in other safety critical domains such as that of aircraft certification where 
ARP 4754A [79] recognizes the traceability between design decisions and safety critical sys-
tem functionality, as crucial to the design process. Recently however, this has been increas-
ingly observed in the automotive industry as well, with the NHTSA guidelines for automated 
vehicles also emphasizing the need for traceability in design decisions to risks that could 
impact safety-critical functionality [80]. The only two safety reports (that the author is aware 
of at the time of this publication) released according to the guidelines of the NHTSA from 
Waymo [14] and by GM [81] discuss the use of risk management through the design stages 
and claim to adhere to these guidelines. Axelsson in [82] classifies the types of uncertainty 
in the process of architecting and suggests high-level mitigation strategies for use by archi-
tects. In academia, papers like [83] demonstrate the use of rationale with design decisions but 
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the framework they use to manage it is not explicitly shown. Some papers excel at one of  
rationale management [84], or tracking of assumptions [85], at the expense of the other. Con-
tract based design, proposed for safety critical systems in the automotive industry in papers 
like [86], are directly benefited by the rigorous tracking of the assumptions made in the de-
sign of the system. The need for tracking of decisions and impact analysis of during the iter-
ative development of the system is also noted in [87]. Chen et. al [88] take a similar approach 
but use design decisions primarily as justification within a safety case. In contrast, the ap-
proach taken in this thesis is to focus on the design decisions in a larger context, primarily 
viewing safety as a constraint rather than the objective of architecting.  
Experiences with the attempt to introduce ATAM gave first-hand experience of the over-
head of introducing heavy processes into an organization. This overhead may have a coun-
terproductive role in the organization and slow down the development phase if not checked, 
reflecting the views of Sexton et. al. [89] in that balance is needed in the speed of concept 
design and the assurance of functional safety.  
Thus while none of the principles mentioned so far are new on their own, the combined 
use of them to create related methods and processes (Paper B and Paper C) appears to our 
understanding to be a novel contribution. These methods and processes are moreover sup-
ported by tools (to support the ATRIUM from  Paper C) within the specific context (described 
in Section 2 and Paper A), make them a methodology for the purposes of Architecting the 
PAA. The methodology is the main contribution of this thesis. 
3.4 Viewpoint Definition 
This section will define the Functional Safety viewpoint as per ISO 42010 [6] and define 
the PAA as a view, using terms from Paper B and Paper C. The viewpoint definition in this 
section was created according to the template and the guidelines suggested by Hilliard in 
[90]. 
Table 3: Functional Safety Viewpoint Definition 
1.  Viewpoint name 
Functional Safety  
2. Viewpoint overview  
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This viewpoint is used primarily for the creation and maintenance of the PAA work prod-
uct, as required by ISO 26262. The PAA view governed by this viewpoint has the goal of 
documenting rationale of, and assumptions, about design decisions, including but not lim-
ited to, on the safe reuse of legacy elements in automated driving scenarios. This view-
point and the associated view of PAA supports the safety engineering processes by, 1. 
Explicitly stating the uncertain information used in design decisions for the purposes of 
impact analysis, 2. Providing architectural input for the purposes of rationale for ASIL 
decomposition, 3. Assessing and communicating the strengths and the weaknesses of 
available platform elements, and 4. Justifying the creation of new requirements on exist-
ing elements, or the creation of new elements to fulfil functionality, at required integrity 
levels. 
3. Concerns and Stakeholders 
3.1 Concerns 
+ Which architectural alternatives are available for the purposes of ASIL decomposition 
in the concept phase? 
+ What assumptions were made as the basis for a particular design decision? 
+ Which variants of a given element have been chosen as acceptable for the purposes of 
implementation of a particular function? 
+ How often has a particular element failed in the field? 
+ What are the constraints or dependencies, on the rest of the platform if a particular 
Design Alternative is chosen? 
+ Under which particular configuration(s) of the platform can a minimal risk condition 
be reached given a particular failure mode according to the current state of analysis? 
+ For a particular configuration of a platform, which failure modes have been analysed in 
the design? 
+ Which Assumptions affect a particular element? i.e. Which elements are affected when 
new information related to the assumption is obtained? 
+ Which stakeholder made a particular design decision? 
+ Which Design Alternatives were considered in the making of a particular decision? 
+ Which Design Alternatives were rejected in the making of a particular design decision 
and why? 
+ Why was a particular Design Alternative chosen over the others? 
+ Under which conditions can two Elements fulfil the freedom of interference criterion 
such that ASIL decomposition can be made? 
3.2. Typical Stakeholders  
The roles of: 
1. Architects specifically those who work at the vehicle level. 
2. Domain Experts such as ECU designers, function realization engineers, 
function designers etc.  
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3. Safety Engineers. 
3.3. Anti-concerns  
This viewpoint is not appropriate or particularly useful to address  
- mechanical considerations such as packaging 
- refined or detailed technical questions or characteristics  
4. Model kinds 
The model kinds used in this viewpoint are: 
1. PAA_Base  
2. Subsystem_Report 
5. PAA_base 
5.1. PAA_base conventions 
5.1.1 PAA_base Conventions 
5.1.1.1. Model kind languages or notations 
A DSL capable of modelling Platform Elements and their interaction from a functional 
perspective, for the purposes of the meta-model in Figure 11. 
5.1.1.2 Model kind meta-model  
The meta-model can be found in Figure 11. 
5.2. Subsystem_Report 
5.2.1. Subsystem_Report Conventions 
5.2.1.1 Model kind languages or notations 
Subsystem report template. A textual report that lists monitors and linked information. 
5.2.1.2 Model kind meta-model  
Plain text subsystem report that follows the Method M1 described in Paper B, in associ-
ating information with specific diagnostic Monitors. 
  
24   |   Research Objectives 
 
 
 
6. Operations on views 
Construction methods: As described in Paper B and Paper C. 
7. Correspondence Rules 
Inter-view correspondences:  
Sharing of elements with any other views that use the DSL model. 
Intra-view correspondences:  
Correspondences between Elements of PAA_base and the information from Subsys-
tem_Report.  
 
8. Examples <optional> 
9. Notes <optional> 
10. Sources 
• Specification of the functions in the platform. 
• Available FMEAs and Hazard analyses. 
• SAE J3016 for functions related to automation. 
• Documentation on the DSL used. 
• ISO 42010, ISO 26262 
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4. Research design 
This section presents an overview of the choice of the research methods used within this 
work and the motivation for their selection in Section 4.1, before discussing the claims and 
threats to validity in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. 
4.1 Research methodology 
 A way to visualize the work in this thesis is using the framework described by Checkland 
and Holwell in [91], where they describe elements essential to any piece of research as a 
Framework of Ideas, a specific Method and an Area of Concern. Figure 4 is a redrawn [92] 
image using the elements from the framework, as applied to this thesis. Figure 4 illustrates 
how, within this framework, ideas of Papers B and Paper C using the method of Engineering 
Design [93], are applied to the Area Of Concern scoped by Paper A i.e. architecting func-
tionally safe vehicles. 
Research taken as the activity that leads to the creation of new knowledge [94] is, accord-
ing to Creswell in [95], characterized by the choice of three of its principal components i.e. 
the choice of the philosophical world-view e.g. constructivist, post-positivist etc., the design 
of the research e.g. qualitative, quantitative, mixed methods etc., and the choice of specific 
methods. As seen in Section 3, architecting is related to a system design role, and the architect 
Figure 4: Research Design in Perspective; Adapted from [91] 
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considers a wide variety of requirements, both functional and extra functional, as inputs and 
aims to reach a concept that is a satisfactory concept for the stakeholders involved. The mul-
titude of stakeholders, their intertwined concerns, and the need for balancing these concerns 
to achieve desired qualities, leads to the consequence that research in methodologies for ar-
chitecting, must necessarily reflect this complex socio-cultural context, to be useful in any 
fashion. The choice of the pragmatic world-view [95] taken within this research is thus a 
natural conclusion based on the nature of the domain being studied.  
Data collection in pragmatic research also fits very well with the nature of architecting 
where, depending on the context, the desired abstraction level of the system of interest, and 
the stage in the lifecycle of the work products, data needed may be available in both quanti-
tative or qualitative forms. Mixed-methods research, as championed by a pragmatic world-
view, is not committed to any single system of philosophy, allowing the use of the method 
that derives suitable knowledge, unconstrained by classifications such as quantitative or qual-
itative. Data collected and used in this thesis has comprised qualitative and quantitative 
sources of varying degrees [96]. An overview of the data collected for input and for valida-
tion, along with the validation strategies employed, is given in Table 4.  
Much has been spoken in literature about suitable research methods in the field of systems 
engineering. Valerdi and Davidz note the role the results-oriented approach adopted by the 
current researchers of systems engineering in [97], and also emphasize the need for the right 
methodology to be selected, as do the authors of [98] and [99]. Müller in [100] gives a range 
of methods currently in use, discusses the validation challenges of these methods and comes 
to the conclusion that the current research is limited by the uniqueness of each field situation 
and making hard claims is close to impossible. These statements apply equally to the field of 
architecting and make the choice of a specific research method a challenge in itself. 
The specific method of Engineering Design as defined by Ferris in [93] aligned with both 
the goals of the project, and the pragmatic views of the researcher. This thesis as does Ferris, 
ascribes to knowledge being in of three primary forms of “declarative”, “functional” and 
“procedural knowledge” as defined by Biggs in [101]. In contrast to natural sciences which 
targets knowledge of the declarative kind, Engineering Design primarily aims to uncover 
knowledge of the other two forms i.e. the functional and procedural aspects of knowing how 
the solution to a design problem is formulated functionally, and how it is to be applied.  En-
gineering Design prioritizes the Proof-by-construction method to judge the effectiveness of 
the design i.e. the building and the analysis of prototypes – which lends naturally to the Case 
Studies in the papers included.  
 
  
Research methodology   |   27 
 
 
 
T
a
b
le
 4
: 
D
a
ta
 S
o
u
r
ce
s 
in
 t
h
is
 T
h
es
is
 
  
28   |   Research design 
 
 
 
The knowledge developed with the Engineering Design method is certain since it solves 
a problem in it its context, by definition. The certainty of created knowledge is what differ-
entiates Engineering Design from other methods like Action Research [102] where 
knowledge is considered to be relativist. This differentiation is highlighted in [103] where 
criteria for a taxonomy of research methods is provided for the ease of analysis. The solution 
oriented approach of Engineering Design and the principle of finding a satisfactory, distin-
guished from optimal, product is aligned with the general principles of Design Science Re-
search which has found broad application in the field of Information Systems [104]. The 
thesis borrows the framework from [105] to ground the engineering design method. Figure 5 
redrawn from [106], shows the different cycles in Design Science Research; the Design Cycle 
is where the artefacts and processes of need are developed, within the context gained from 
the Relevance Cycle, and where the available knowledge is grounded with the knowledge 
base of the rigour cycle.  
 
By the scoping provided by Paper A in the relevance cycle, Paper B provides a way to 
extract information from legacy systems, for use in the process provided in Paper C. The 
work that has been presented in Section 3.4., Paper B and Paper C, involved several shorter 
loops in the Design Cycle with the use of toy examples and iterative evaluation by experts.  
Paper B and Paper C are further grounded in the Rigour Cycle, i.e. experience and expertise 
of the architect, and industrial best practices such as ISO 26262. They provide design prod-
ucts such as the subsystem reports, and design processes such as the method M1 and the 
process ATRIUM. 
Figure 5: Research Cycles in Design Science; Redrawn from [106] 
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4.2 Claims to validity 
Robson in [107] gives four different aspects of validity i.e. construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability. Using this classification, this subsection briefly de-
scribes the claims to validity and finishes by elaborating on the relation to methodology and 
the threats to validity. 
Construct Validity 
Construct validity is the measure of how the observed variables reflect the reality of the 
situation. Two main approaches were used in the included papers to ensure this; the first was 
by the use of diverse types of studies by using iterative examples, i.e. with progression from 
controlled toy examples to the realistic studies depicted in the papers B and C, to ensure that 
the ideas held. The second approach taken was to ensure that both academic and industrial 
participants were part of the studies. Papers B and C use expert opinions from the industry to 
construct the methods described therein and utilize reviewers from academia while the ex-
ploratory Paper A included a mix of participants from both academia and industry as part of 
the initial workshops.  An advantage of working with industrial case studies is that flaws in 
construct validity become apparent relatively quickly. Paper B uses heuristics designed and 
reviewed for ordinary understanding along with detailed examples of application to limit 
misinterpretations between the researcher’s and the users understanding. 
Reliability 
Reliability relates to the repeatability of the work and the reduction of researcher bias, i.e. 
will another researcher come to the same conclusions based on the data used. For quantitative 
methods of analysis, reliability claims are understandably easier to make than for qualitative 
methods. Thus, while Paper A can make a weak claim for reliability based on the quantifica-
tion used, Papers B and C which rely on qualitative analysis to a larger degree cannot make 
such claims. All three papers suffer from this limitation when judged for by reliability by 
traditional terms. This is a well-known limitation within the naturalistic settings of qualitative 
research and the method of case studies and has been addressed by papers in literature e.g. 
by Golshani [108] who advocates the need to redefine these terms for qualitative research. 
Campbell in [109] takes the view that reliability in qualitative research is achieved through 
an audit of the procedures used and items such as raw data, data reduction products, and 
process notes. Following this view, a claim for reliability can be made based on the elucida-
tion of the steps taken in the work, the data and processes used within the thesis.  
Internal Validity 
Internal validity is the measure of the quality of the findings themselves i.e. if the findings 
accurately explain the effects observed. The judgement of internal validity has been treated 
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in this work as a function of its utility, as judged by the experts in the review process within 
the Rigour Cycle from Figure 5. By the utility of the design artefacts created, such as the 
subsystem report from Paper B, the output deliverables from Paper C and its subsequent 
comparison to the results from a control group, internal validity can be claimed. A similar 
claim can be made for Paper A, in that it sets the scope for the other two papers, and the 
choices made because of its findings, have proven to be useful through the progress of this 
work. 
External Validity 
External validity also known as generalizability or transferability is the aspect of validity 
that is measured by the extent to which it is possible to generalize the findings. Whether the 
findings from a work are “generalizable” however, depends on what level the work aims to 
be generalizable to. This work aspires to be generalizable beyond the primary industrial part-
ner i.e. Scania, within the larger automotive industry. To this end, care was taken during 
research design to ensure that if there were choices to be made, such as concerns/factors in 
Paper A, or roles and use of design artefacts such as in Paper B and Paper C, they were 
general enough to be commonly available across OEMs in the industry or were made on the 
basis of relevant standards such as ISO 26262. This thesis can claim to be generalizable 
within this context of automotive OEMs though not necessarily in other domains.   
4.3 Limitations and Threats to Validity 
This subsection expands on the threats to validity (touched upon in section 4.2) by as-
sessing them, and discussing the steps taken towards mitigation, following principles by 
Runesson and Höst in [110], and Feldt and Magazinius [111]. 
A long-standing issue that the author has faced in this work has been the barrier, to discuss 
specific details of the case studies. Instead the papers discuss representative cases and find-
ings. This means that there is a threat that details, about the methodology presented as a 
contribution in this thesis, may have been inadvertently omitted from inclusion. Unless the 
methodology is used by other researchers, the threat could lead to different results i.e. a lack 
of repeatability. This threat has been addressed partly by reviews and changes according to 
feedback from, presentations at publication venues as well as other industrial and academic 
workshops, and from engineers that were not part of the work itself, i.e. with no direct vested 
interest or prior knowledge of the specifics of this work.  
Validation of research of a qualitative nature is challenging in general because of the po-
tentially larger influence of subjectivity and biases. The core of the nature of the validity of 
the work is derived from the utility it provides to the organization using it. The work pre-
sented in this thesis is considered to be useful as it is in accordance with standard industry 
practices, is accepted by the end users, and has been integrated to the larger tool ecosystem 
within the organization concerned. Though the methodology presented in this thesis has 
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found industrial acceptance, it cannot claim to be the only way to solve the same problem in 
a similar context. There are only claims of sufficiency through this work, not optimality. 
Here, the proof is by construction and demonstration such as championed by the method of 
engineering design.  
One of the common themes of this research has been a heavy use of expert opinion, both 
industrial and academic for the purposes of validation. A threat therefore, lies in the diversity 
of the experts. For example, though the opinions of various engineers from Scania have been 
used to shape this thesis, the fact that a large majority of them are employed at the same 
organization could induce a some bias to the findings. This threat has been considered in for 
example Paper C where the findings of a control group from a sister organization was used, 
but was not considered for Papers A and B where the ideas and the analysis itself were more 
relevant than the actual result (which was assumed to depend heavily on the goals of the 
organization employing the ideas).  
To address the threat of researcher bias, the experts chosen to review the validity have 
been different from the authors of the papers. Academic experts were chosen to assess the 
results if the authors have been industrial such as in Paper C, or vice versa such as in Paper 
B.  
Another threat exists in the end-goal of the work i.e. the final quantification step where 
the field data is to be used to design the PAA and provide a basis for the allocation and 
decomposition of the ASIL requirements. This thesis has so far not reached the stage where 
that quantification can take place and given the large number of factors affecting this work, 
the risk remains that a yet unknown factor may exist that will necessitate changes in the 
methods of Paper B  and C.   
  
  
32   |   Summary of Included Papers 
 
 
 
5. Summary of Included Papers 
This section will discuss what the included papers contribute with individually in Sections 
5.1 through 5.3, concluding with a discussion in Section 5.4, on how these contributions tie 
together to form a methodology for architecting the PAA.  
5.1 Paper A: Setting the Scope 
Aim and Research Question 
Paper A is a position paper that addresses the research question RQ1 “What are the im-
plications of the ways that the ADI can be coupled with legacy platforms?” by eliciting 
the challenges for achieving automated driving, from the frame of reference of chosen per-
spectives.   
Approach 
The work presented in Paper A was performed in two steps. The first step involved the 
identification of the different perspectives within the ARCHER project, in a workshop be-
tween the stakeholders. The stakeholders comprised of a diverse mix of 4 PhD candidates, 4 
senior academics and 3 industrial participants.  
The perspectives of interest selected in the first step were 
• Business aspects i.e. the influences of costs, variability, vehicular platform lifetimes, 
time to market etc.  
• Functional safety i.e. the influences of the spread of the ASIL requirements through 
the platform, the interaction between different safety critical functions etc.  
• Dependability i.e. decrease in reliability due to the larger number of elements be-
cause of both expected failures and higher attack surfaces [112], the need to maintain 
availability in the presence of this decrease in reliability etc. 
• Verification i.e. the need for composability of the ADI and its effect on the verifica-
tion effort needed etc.  
• Realization i.e. the issues in integrating the cases with the existing legacy platform 
in a feasible fashion etc. hidden text for formatting 
Having identified the perspectives, 5 architectural cases were chosen representing the di-
verse ways in which the ADI could be integrated into the legacy Platform. These cases were 
chosen as appropriate representative cases from across the mechatronic spectrum. Case 1 
represents a mechanical way to integrate with the platform. The transition Cases 2 and 3 
represent an increasing integration with existing legacy systems without modification. Case 
4 represents the case where there is a larger propensity to modify legacy systems to suit the 
needs of the ADI. The last case is Case 5 where the entire Platform is designed from scratch 
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based on what the ADI requires from the platform. Cases 2 through 4 are represented in 
Figure 6 along with the symbolic layered Platform where a lower layer indicates a deeper 
platform integration. 
 The aim of creating the cases was to gather the concerns of the perspectives influential to 
the task and analysing them in concrete contexts simultaneously, rather than in isolation, 
thereby trying to highlight the interplay between them. It emerged during the discussion that 
the perspectives were too broad and that the Cases had various levels of desirability even 
within a single perspective. E.g. a Case could be rated highly in terms of verification efforts 
of the platform while being rated low in the verification efforts of the ADI. Factors of interest 
from within the perspectives where the cases could be rated differently that were identified 
were: 
• Higher Platform Reuse 
• Lower accidental Complexity (on reuse) 
• Lower Variability (across platform) 
Figure 6: Cases used in Paper A 
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• Lower Development Cost Upfront 
• Lower Development Cost over time 
• Higher Reliability/Availability 
• Reduced dependence for Safety Related Diagnostics 
• Higher Security 
• Ease of Verification of the Platform 
• Ease of Verification of the ADI 
• Lesser or Controlled Information Flow 
In the second step, discussions were held in a second workshop, and the cases were rated 
according to factors of interest on a scale from 1 to 5 by the participants, leading to the col-
lection of quantified data that was used for analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
During the analysis, two different groupings of the cases emerged. The Cases 1-3 were 
grouped together because of their common characteristic of trying to maintain the legacy 
systems untouched, Case 3 was the chosen as the most feasible solution in this group. Simi-
larly, Cases 4 and 5 were grouped together by their common characteristic of prioritization 
of the ADI over the legacy platform, in that the Platform could be modified as needed to fulfil 
the functional or extra functional requirements of the ADI. Case 4 appeared to be the most 
feasible for implementation primarily because of the ability for incremental change as per 
needs rather than a complete redesign. The scoring of the choices from the grouping i.e. Cases 
Figure 7: Ratings of the Architectural Cases from Paper A by a Sample Group 
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3 and 4 are shown in Figure 7, in a radar graph where the distance from the origin is an 
indicator for desirability, from the point of view of the factors of interest at the edges of the 
graph. The Cases 3 and 4 were thus chosen to be the most likely scenarios for the addition of 
ADI, according to the views of the authors. 
Paper A thus provided the main contributions of, (i) a classification for the diverse ways 
in which the ADI could be coupled to the platform and, (ii) an analysis from the different 
perspectives that are of importance to the automotive industry. The contributions address a 
gap, seen in Section 3.3, in that there is a very limited discourse addressing the addition of 
automation into legacy platforms. Paper A also served the purpose of scoping the field of 
interest and enunciating the concerns that would influence both the larger ARCHER project 
as well as this thesis. One of the most crucial needs from the Business perspective, that of 
maintaining as much of the legacy platform as possible, received rationale from the other 
perspectives, and heavily influenced the other papers discussed in the following subsections. 
5.2 Paper B: Extracting Legacy Information  
Aim and Research Question 
The need of reusing legacy elements was seen as critically important in Paper A in terms 
of saving costs, and constraining the design space for the newly designed elements. Section 
2.4 discusses the significance of the role of the driver in the design and development of the 
platform and highlights the importance of reanalysing legacy elements in the new context of 
automated driving.  
Considering that the information of interest was related to legacy systems, i.e. systems 
whose reuse could be a priority based on extra-functional requirements such as cost savings, 
a natural conclusion was to try to integrate this information as early as possible in the devel-
opment process and the safety lifecycle. The PAA was chosen as the point where the infor-
mation should be integrated.  
Paper B attempts to consolidate the needs by focussing on the PAA and by addressing the 
research question RQ2  
How can detailed domain specific information about legacy subsystems be extracted 
from the platform for the purposes of design of the PAA? 
Approach 
The diversity of the types, and the sheer number, of specialized elements from the platform 
needed to achieve automated driving meant that the information available to be extracted was 
equally diverse. The method M1 was designed to address to extract information in a way that 
would be repeatable across this diversity. In the investigation of how legacy information 
could be extracted from the platform, the following subtasks needed to be completed. 
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i. Identify suitable information to be extracted, and its source. 
ii. Identify how the information would be extracted. 
iii. Identify where and how the result, i.e. the extracted information, would be used within 
the safety lifecycle. 
iv. Identify the level of abstraction needed, and the format for the result. 
v. Identify the organizational roles involved and their responsibilities within the method.  
The different organizational roles of interest were identified as the roles of the Architects, 
Domain Experts and the Safety Engineers, with the Domain Experts being the primary users 
of the method delivering their expertise in a concise form to the Architects. The architects 
were envisioned as collecting this information from the various legacy subsystems and using 
this as a basis for the design of the PAA to provide to the safety engineers. With the rationale 
of reuse, the concept phase from ISO 26262, was seen as suitable point in the lifecycle, for 
the purpose of early integration of legacy information.  
Available work products from completed projects were evaluated to decide the source of 
the information extraction, and the diagnostic specifications work product was chosen from 
amongst the available options. The reason for choosing diagnostic specifications as the data 
source was to obtain a direct connection to the faults and the failure modes of the individual 
subsystems, since these are relevant to functional safety. The diagnostic specifications com-
prise information on monitors set in place to detect faults in parts of the subsystem such as 
conditions for trigger, debounce times, Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) connected to the 
monitor etc. The link to the DTCs provides the additional advantage that it allows for a direct 
connection to field data of occurrence of faults allowing for a potential quantification metric 
to be added to the selection of a particular set of subsystems. Detailed information on the use 
of diagnostic specifications in the industry can be found in the ISO standard for specifications 
for Unified Diagnostic Services [113] or in guidebooks such as [114]. 
The method M1 is to be used for all subsystems identified by the architect as necessary 
for the automated driving function in question. Following the method entails for the Domain 
Expert of a subsystem to follow a set of heuristics in the form of questions and assimilating 
the answers into a subsystem report. The questions are designed to investigate the effects of 
the ADI replacing the human driver within the subsystem or in other subsystems. The ques-
tions are designed to guide the Domain Expert in finding changes that will be needed to the 
subsystem in the new context of automated driving. Each question gives a rationale to set the 
context and examples of concerns and how they could be addressed from the case study. The 
heuristics thus give a separation of concerns between the roles of the Architect and the Do-
main Experts. By providing a basic usage context and guidelines to the Domain Expert, the 
heuristics allow them to abstract their knowledge to a level that is useful to the architects.  
The Electronic Braking Subsystem (EBS) used at Scania was used as an object of a case 
study to judge the utility of the method as the EBS was: 
(a) One of the most important subsystems for automated driving; the most capable brak-
ing system in the platform 
(b) Almost certain to be re-used rather than re-designed from scratch for the first auto-
mated driving function 
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(c) Semi-redundant as there are other methods of braking available in the platform albeit 
without the same performance levels or robustness. See Figure 8a, for a brief over-
view of the types of braking systems available in a modern vehicle. 
(d) A complex safety critical system that is directly responsible for various basic dynamic 
and stability related functions e.g. ABS and indirectly responsible for many actuating 
other functions for safety including those that are legally regulated such as Advanced 
Emergency Braking systems (AEB). See Figure 8b for an overview of the pneumatic 
systems controlled by the EBS ECU. 
Results and Discussion 
The case study looked at about 700+ diagnostic monitors and identified several failures 
that could be handled by the inherent redundancy present in the platform. It was also possible 
to isolate about 40 failures of the EBS subsystem that could not be handled within the sub-
system. These failures identified aspects that needed to be addressed by either the ADI or a 
newly designed subsystem upon selection of the EBS for an automated driving function.  
The research used quantitative archival data i.e. the diagnostic specifications and qualita-
tive interpretations of it from the Domain Experts from the industry. The Domain Experts 
and the academic co-authors of the paper judged the utility of the paper based on the case 
study and the analysis of the method M1 itself. They found it to: 
• be useful in concretely aiding PAA design due to its systematic nature of finding 
requirements for the ADI and the elements of the legacy platform. 
• have potential in the quantification of the PAA design by using field data on DTCs 
to determine failure rates of Elements. 
The main contributions of Paper B are as follows: (1) the novel idea of using of diagnostic 
specifications to facilitate the PAA design (2) the heuristics-based method M1 centred on the 
removal of the driver for functions related to automated driving. 
In the case study the impact of even relatively minor changes to the underlying platform, 
on the higher layers, became apparent. Safety as a system level property is subject to these 
intricacies of the subsystems. In choosing to use a legacy system within a new automated 
driving function, the limitations of the system in this new context, i.e. the absence of a human 
driver as a fall back, has to be thoroughly analysed so that, (a) new subsystems are designed 
to cover the limitations within legacy and, (b) there is no overlap of functionality between 
the new design and the old to save costs. While this is currently done by experienced archi-
tects, mistakes are not unheard of. With the advent of automated driving functions and its 
increase in complexity, there is a concern that there are greater chances for mistakes to be 
made in the process of architecting. Paper C proposes a way with ATRIUM to formalize the 
process of architecting within the concept phase, to ameliorate the concern.  
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Figure 8: Case Study in Paper B 
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5.3 Paper C: Utilizing Legacy Information & Uncertainty Management 
Aim and Research Question 
The role of the architect and the uncertainty involved in the process of architecting have 
been discussed in Section 3.3. But given that the uncertainty is unavoidable in new designs, 
and in cases of changes in context involving reuse of legacy systems, emphasis needs to be 
placed to minimize the uncertainty in the process of architecting and to be able to mitigate it 
where possible. 
Paper C thus partially addresses research question RQ2 in defining the use of the legacy 
information generated from Paper B and primarily addresses the research question RQ3 
How can the decision making of architects under uncertain information be managed 
to achieve the traceability needed for design of safety critical systems? 
Approach 
Paper C proposes a process “ArchiTectural RefInement using Uncertainty Management” 
(ATRIUM) to mitigate the uncertainty in design decisions and to track the impact of uncer-
tainty in design decisions through the project lifecycle.  
The following paragraphs summarize the details of ATRIUM while italicizing the terms 
introduced by ATRIUM to distinguish them from their nominal meanings in English. 
ATRIUM provides activities in the form of UML activity diagrams along with a meta-model 
detailing the relationship between the data elements. An iteration represents one complete 
execution of the process as shown in Figure 9. The core of ATRIUM involves separation of 
available information into two domains, namely the Perceived Certain and the Uncertain 
domain. The information in Perceived Certain domain is static and traceability and con-
sistency can be maintained. The Uncertain domain contains information that could be subject 
to change.  
Assumptions serve as the meeting point between these two domains and transform uncer-
tain information into Perceived Certain information. An assumption may correspond to a 
functional goal, constraint, operational condition, or any information needed for architectural 
decisions. The nature of assumption is deliberately kept generic to accommodate for the wide 
variety of inputs that are used by architects. An assumption has a single qualifier of validity, 
which can take values of valid or invalid. Assumptions can be added at any point during the 
process flow. In ATRIUM, Architects primarily work in the Perceived Certain domain while 
the other stakeholders i.e. the experts and the safety engineers work in the Uncertain domain. 
The experts provide the service of clarifying and correcting information in the Uncertain 
domain for the architects.  
An element has a qualifier called state. State can take values of legacy or new develop-
ment. Legacy is assigned as value for the element if it has been available before the first 
iteration of the process is initiated. If the element is created during the execution of ATRIUM, 
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state is assigned the value of new. The platform thus is made up of legacy elements and new 
elements are added to it with ATRIUM.  
A Component Failure Alternative or CFA is a unique combination of a failure mode and 
an element. Each CFA has a single qualifier state, which can have either of the two values, 
processed or unprocessed. A processed value indicates that the CFA in question has been 
analysed to the best of the current knowledge available within the process iteration. An un-
processed CFA indicates that either the CFA was never analysed or that additional infor-
mation at least partially invalidated the CFA analysis. 
The inputs referred to by the “gather inputs” abstraction in turn refer to the output of the 
previous iteration (if available), the technology roadmap of the organization and information 
about the elements. 
 A Design Goal or DG is the intended behaviour that the vehicle should achieve in case 
of a failure. Each CFA is linked to exactly one DG. A DG is comprised of one or more Sub 
Design Goals (SDGs) which are combined in definite ways to achieve the particular DG 
using e.g. a time based or a state-based representation. Any SDG might be further broken 
down into more SDGs as needed i.e. the abstraction level of the SDG is left to the choice of 
the architects. A Design Alternative or DA is a possible architectural solution that fulfils the 
DG. Each CFA is analysed separately and if the existing elements cannot fulfil the chosen 
DG, one or more DAs that enable it to do so are assigned to the CFA. A processed CFA can 
be linked to zero DAs only if elements under consideration already fulfil the DGs. The ab-
straction of “Define process parameters” in Figure 9 refers to deciding the elements, failure 
modes, DGs and generating the CFAs.  
Selection as a noun is the subset of DAs, out of the set of all possible DAs, chosen to be 
included as part of the refined PA. A selection is made as part of the concluding activity of 
the ATRIUM iteration i.e. in the “generate revised architecture” abstraction in Figure 9. 
A link is the term used to describe a connection made between informational entities for 
the purposes of traceability of information. Links found in the Perceived Certain domain 
correspond to connections between assumptions to CFAs, CFAs to DAs and DAs to the se-
lection. Thus, the selection can always be back-traced to assumptions at any point in the 
process. 
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Figure 10b shows the activities of the process in the Perceived Certain domain and the 
management of CFAs. An analysis is performed per CFA and results in zero or more DAs 
while assumptions and clarifications are documented along with the appropriate links. When 
the selection is made, the reasons for rejecting the other DAs are recorded along with the 
reason for choosing the selection.  
The abstraction of “process new element” refers to adding new elements and populating 
of the CFAs of those elements. The abstraction of “process new assumption” refers to not 
only adding the assumption to the list, but also the action of reviewing of all CFAs processed 
so far to see if the assumption has necessitated a new analysis of any CFAs. When new in-
formation is obtained that changes or invalidates an existing assumption, all linked CFAs are 
marked as unprocessed for subsequent analysis. 
Figure 10a shows the process flow in the Uncertain domain. Links are also found in the 
Uncertain domain and are established from a clarification to an assumption, or a task to an 
Figure 9: Main Process Flow in ATRIUM 
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assumption. A clarification contains detailed questions that must be answered by the second-
ary users like the experts. All necessary, but uncertain information become clarifications and 
are tracked individually. Each clarification requires the creation of an assumption, made 
based on information available and the judgement of the architects to allow work from the 
architects to progress in the Perceived Certain domain. If even the expert does not have ac-
cess to the information immediately, the clarification becomes a task. The abstraction “con-
vert clarification to task” in refers to this process. A task has resources allocated to it and is 
under the expert’s responsibility to complete by a mutually agreed date. The expected dates 
for completion, name of architect responsible and expert are all documented with the task. 
Unfinished tasks at the end of an iteration of the process become risks and are collected in 
the risk list deliverable. This is depicted by the abstraction of “generate risk list” in Figure 9.  
A clarification and an assumption are never deleted. Clarifications or tasks (when com-
plete) are marked as resolved only after expert consultation (i.e. if the assumption linked to 
the clarification was correct or if the existing assumption is marked as invalid and a new 
assumption is added and linked to both the relevant CFAs and the resolved clarification). 
The link to the piece of information used for a particular selection is thus never lost. ISO 
26262 change management process which requires a change request, an analysis, documen-
tation of decision, rationale and implemented changes is thus fulfilled at this abstraction level. 
The process iteration is completed when (i) there are no clarifications remaining, (ii) there 
are no unprocessed CFAs and, (iii) a selection has been made. A selection is chosen as part 
of the “Generate Revised Architecture” abstraction. The reason for allowing the selection to 
be made only at the end of the iteration is because DAs may potentially satisfy multiple 
CFAs, thus limiting the number of changes needed for the system as a whole. ATRIUM does 
not prescribe any particular method for the selection and allows organizations to use their 
own. 
Results and Discussion 
The main contributions of Paper C are the process ATRIUM which gives a flexible way 
to create and refine the PAA, the analysis of the problem and the discussion of the findings 
from the case studies conducted.  
The linking between the data elements of ATRIUM is shown in Figure 11. The delivera-
bles of ATRIUM are the PAA comprised of the refined Preliminary Architecture (PA) i.e. 
the Selection, the assumption list and the risk list. The way to interpret the results of ATRIUM 
is that the refined PA is valid under the assumptions listed in the assumption list and is subject 
to risks documented in the risk list. ATRIUM, in addition to providing a PAA also documents 
links between failures and assumptions, thus providing easy access to rationales from previ-
ous iterations. This enables a basis for consistent discussion, and relevant decisions can be 
made accordingly and with documented justification. 
The requirements based on which ATRIUM was designed were collected after multiple 
workshops with stakeholders and the process was refined over a few toy examples. Once the 
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process was found to be satisfactory, it was used in the design of an L3 (Level 3 automated 
driving function) function at Scania to harden a legacy system against single point failures.  
The L3 function’s known requirements were expanded using the adaptIVe scheme [115] 
according to the input of the domain experts. The DGs used in the case studies related to 
achieving the minimal risk conditions defined for particular CFAs. Several types of minimal 
risk conditions were identified as needed e.g. based on the physical characteristics of the 
motion of the vehicle such as the speed and its relative position on the road at the time of the 
fault detection. Other characteristics of the environment, the ability of the driver to take over, 
the ability of the system to degrade etc., were also taken into consideration in the selection 
of suitable minimal risk conditions. Where the behaviours needed from the different DGs had 
common characteristics, SDGs were defined encapsulating the common behaviours and re-
defining the DGs as a sequence of particular SDGs. Additional details about the case study 
can be found in the appended paper.  
The process uncovered several tacit assumptions that were made about the elements (in-
cluding legacy, new and the ADI), and was useful to ground the requirements for the newly 
designed elements based on the limitations from the legacy elements. The deliverables were 
judged to be of better quality than those produced by the previous methods and those pro-
duced by a control group of architects working for the same function.  
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5.4 Discussion of the Results 
This thesis provides a set of related methods, processes and tools (Paper B and Paper C), 
i.e. a methodology, to achieve the goal of designing the PAA view of the architecture, as 
defined by the viewpoint from Section 3.4, in the context set by Paper A.  
This thesis thus uses automated driving as a context to  
• determine the implications to automotive platforms: Paper A. 
• motivate the need for reuse of legacy information: Paper A and Paper B. 
• design a method to extract legacy information:  Paper B. 
• position where the extracted information can be used, i.e. the PAA, defining its 
structure and content:  Section 3.4 
• reduce the uncertainty in architecting, by grounding the design of new elements 
on legacy information where possible, i.e. constraining the available design 
choices: Paper B and Paper C. 
• mitigate the impact of the remaining uncertainty by tracking the influence of it 
over the elements used in the design: Paper C. 
• design a process for reusing legacy information and systematically architecting the   
PAA: Paper C 
Legacy based design, as a mid-way solution between the top down and bottom up ap-
proaches to architecting, serves to constrain the choices that need to be made in the design of 
new functions for the platform by leveraging the knowledge and expertise available within 
the organization. It further helps to reduce the number of iterations needed by a pure top 
down approach to architecting. Paper A investigates several architectural cases which differ 
in how the ADI can integrate into legacy platforms and explores the interdependencies be-
tween some of the most important concerns in the industry. Allowing only for a small set of 
architectural cases focussed the scope of the arguments and allowed for a clearer discussion 
of the concerns faced by each of the perspectives. Findings from Paper A, e.g. the relative 
futility of trying to keep the ADI strictly separate from the rest of the platform from the safety 
perspective, the need for the modularization of the ADI from the verification perspective, the 
emphasis on early delivery and the reuse of legacy from the business perspective etc., helped 
answer RQ1 and were instrumental in shaping the rest of the thesis.  
The aim of the thesis is to help architects in the concept phase to develop safety critical 
systems. To do so, there was a need to consider the recommendations from the predominant 
functional safety standard ISO 26262. In the examination of the standard, and the literature 
concerning the main architectural input in the concept phase, i.e. the PAA, there were no 
satisfactory definitions to be found. To address this gap in knowledge, the viewpoint de-
scribed in Section 3.4 was created based on requirements from the architecting process using 
grounding from the standard, the literature on architecting and expert opinions from senior 
architects. The viewpoint allows for the definition of the PAA as a view of the architecture 
according to the viewpoint thereby providing a common definition that can be reused by other 
OEMs or academia. 
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For the purposes of defining the problem faced by architects during PA design, the entire 
platform is envisioned to be divided into three different divisions (i) the functional elements 
under consideration, (ii) the other elements in the platform and the (iii) ADI. Using this 
model, the RQ2 can be broken down into the following: 
a) Given the selection of a particular functional element i.e. (i), what are the restrictions 
placed on the selection of others i.e. (ii) and the ADI? 
b) Given the answer to a), what new elements must be designed along with the ADI. 
 The overall conceptual view of the methodology of extracting legacy information and 
using it as a basis for design of the PAA is shown in Figure 12. Paper B exploits this break-
down of tasks to answer RQ2 by delivering a method for the reuse of legacy information to 
populate the PAA view. Paper B does so effectively analysing the impact of automation at a 
functional level per subsystem, highlighting the shortcomings and risks of using a particular 
subsystem with the ADI. M1 utilizes the diagnostic specification to analyse the effects of the 
absence of human on the vehicle as a whole and enables a domain expert to utilize his exper-
tise by identifying potential issues and solutions to these. By using the diagnostic specifica-
tions, it brings a gateway to the eventual quantification of the failure rates of the architecture 
due to the intrinsic connection of the specifications to error reporting in the field. The heu-
ristics-based method and the idea of using diagnostic specifications to close the loop between 
design and operation is seen as contribution.  
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 The knowledge gained by the application of Paper B, the viewpoint from Section 3.4. and 
guidance from processes within ISO 26262, are then used to strengthen the process of archi-
tecting itself in Paper C, thereby answering RQ3. While the methodology does not solve the 
presence of uncertainty in design decisions, it does make the uncertainty explicit, and opens 
up the process of architecting for review by making the design decisions and the associated 
assumptions visible. ATRIUM as shown in Paper C has found application in the industry in 
several case studies and is the final creation method for the viewpoint from Section 3.4.  
The combination of the method, process, supporting tool and the viewpoint gives a pow-
erful methodology for meeting the challenges faced in the architecting of automated driving,  
and provides an underpinning for future quantification of the PAA based on failure rates from 
the field. Providing a better solution than the current processes in the industry in terms of 
traceability, management of design decisions, assumptions and rationale, it provides a needed 
work product that justifies the extra overhead caused by the methodology itself.  
 
 
Figure 12: Conceptual View 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Contributions and Impact 
The overall aim of this work has been to meet the sub-goal of the ARCHER project in 
creating methods, tools, and processes to aid architecting, in the face of substantial changes 
that safe automated driving is expected to bring to vehicular platforms. The sub-goal is con-
sidered to have been met in the creation of a methodology for architecting the PAA described 
in this thesis. A clear definition of the PAA and a way to create it has been missing in the 
academic work reviewed and in the ISO 26262 itself. The work thus addresses a gap in the 
safety-critical design of systems and is intended to be a reference for OEMs who wish to 
improve their processes towards ISO26262 compliance.  
The work presented in this thesis has been disseminated at multiple outlets within Scania, 
publication venues, academic and industrial workshops and has been modified according to 
feedback received. The presented methodology has been validated by application at Scania 
both before and after the publication of Paper B and Paper C. Since the publication of the 
papers, other than further application of the methodology, tool support has been added to aid 
the data management and to reduce the manual overhead in working with the methods. A 
prototype of the tool has already been integrated with the Scania tool chain and the method-
ology is now seen as a standard way of working as it provides the needed role separation and 
the framework needed for the design of large and complex functions within the platform.  
Though not included as part of this thesis, another contribution of the work presented here 
is the progress made towards the other sub goal of the ARCHER project i.e. the reference 
architectures for functionally-safe automated driving. During the various case studies under-
taken, as the effects of faults in the platform were examined, the number and importance of 
assumptions made towards run-time risk assessment became evident. This finding was ana-
lysed, and solutions were developed to create safety policy-based architectures influenced by 
supervisory approaches. The solutions include safety policies at design time that constrain 
the operational envelope of automated driving functions under detected or predicted failures. 
These policies allow the responsibility of maintaining a predictable operational envelope to 
be placed on supervisory elements, thereby allowing for the ADI functions to operate freely 
within the envelope. The solutions are the subject of two patent filings made in late 2017.  
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6.2 Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis has strived to facilitate the architecting process for 
safety-critical, automated, automotive systems. However, this work has been limited in na-
ture. There are further avenues to strengthen the work presented and to extend it. Some of 
the research directions are as follows,  
• Refinement of the methodology from this thesis with continued case studies includ-
ing: 
o The addition of metrics to facilitate the process of choosing the Selection as 
part of the “Generate Revised Architecture” step in ATRIUM. 
o The incorporation of field data to the methodology to quantify the failure rate 
of the functional elements. 
o Improvement to the tool designed to aid the methodology 
o Exploratory work in other safety critical domains to generalize the methodol-
ogy. 
• Work on supervisory architectures for functional safety to: 
o Assure an operational envelope that ensures safety while not compromising 
reliability allowing for a better design-time and run-time split in decision mak-
ing. 
o Defining the supervisory element’s structure. E.g. its placement within the 
platform, the need for its distribution etc. 
• Validation of architectural concepts by: 
o Classification of critical scenarios for the purposes of automated driving. 
o Creation of a simulation platform where the architectural alternatives can be 
tested against a defined set of critical scenarios for automated driving. 
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